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Abstract
This article reflects on dimensions of power that occurred in visioning workshops with different stakeholder in the West
Bank and in the Gaza Strip. The overall argument developed in the article is that the visioning process—especially signs of
spatial and institutional dimensions of power—occurred in both cases in a rather similar way, even though the conditions
for planning and visioning are significantly different in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. The visioning process illus-
trated that planning indeed shows signs of mediating space and power. Those power struggles are deeply rooted in the
Palestinian planning history, the long-standing separation between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and the protracted
conflict between Israel and Palestine. Experiencing oneself the ‘dark side of planning’ makes clear that planning is not
benign and that planning can be a powerful tool for either progressive, pluralistic practices or oppressive ones, as means
of regulation and control.
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1. Introduction to Planning in the Palestinian Context
How does planning work in cities and regions that are
contested and conditioned by harsh power asymmetries,
occupation (West Bank) or under siege (Gaza strip)? Our
reflection on a capacity building and planning project in
the Occupied Palestine Territories (West Bank and Gaza)
illustrates in a very straightforward way that planning is
a highly socio-political activity, strongly related and in-
terlinked with the socio-political environment in which
the planning system operates (Rokem & Allegra, 2016).
In the 1990s, Coon (1990, 1992) and Altrock (1998) pro-
vided a comprehensive standard reference on the West
Bank planning system, which Coon coins as ‘planning un-
der occupation’. The occupation has a significant impact
on the planning regime, which we will see later, but the
situation there is highly different than in Gaza, which is
still under siege. From that perspective, the oPt (occu-
pied Palestinian territories) might be a so-called extreme
case (Flyvbjerg, 2006), or extreme arena, for the relation
of power and space that is mediated by planning (Yif-
tachel, 2010). In such arenas, politics and the political
agenda, such as security or housing matters (Chiodelli,
2012; Hague, 2016; Shmueli, 2005) are translated into
plans, policies and institutional designs and communi-
cated. The relation between power and politics has been
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debated in the planning theory, examining planning as a
means of regulation, control and subjection ofminorities
or ethnic groups, which Flyvberg (1996) characterizes as
the ‘dark side’ of planning (e.g. Flyvbjerg, 1996; Flyvb-
jerg & Richardson, 2002; Forester, 1990; Hillier, 2002;
Huxley, 1994; Marcuse, 1976). Yiftachel (1998) describes
four main dimensions of power relations and control: (1)
spatial (territorial), (2) institutional dimension (power re-
lations in decision making and procedures), (3) the re-
sulting socio-economic dimension and (4) the cultural di-
mension. Planners are not decoupled from the field of
power. They are neither neutral nor exclusively techni-
cal experts (Rokem & Allegra, 2016), but are actors in
this arena practising coalition building, networking, lob-
bying and political steering (Wagenaar, 2004). The au-
thors also stress the ambiguity, complexity and discrep-
ancy of the institutional decisionmaking process (Hague,
2016; World Bank, 2008). While the official institutions
recognise the political dimension of planning and deci-
sion making (in terms of Israeli settlements), the reason-
ing for disapproval of outline plans for Palestinian com-
munities remain purely technocratic (Hague, 2016).
The past and present conflicts between Israelis and
Palestinians have created a situation in which the plan-
ning and the entire governance system itself is con-
tested (e.g. Coon, 1992; Yiftachel, 2010) and plays an
instrumental role in reinforcing the social division and
structural processes of discrimination in the popula-
tion based on the ethnic origin (e.g. Reuveny, 2003;
Salamanca, Qato, Rabie, & Samour, 2012; Yiftachel,
1998, 2010). These conflicts and constraints become
most evident in the fields of urban, spatial and trans-
portation planning, especially around housing and set-
tlement policies and practices (Altrock, 1998; Shalbak,
2013). Almost 75% of the Palestinian population lives
in the urban regions of Gaza and the West Bank (Gaza/
Hebron/Jerusalem/Ramallah/Bethlehem). High popula-
tion densities with an average of 778 persons/km2 in the
West Bank and 5,000 persons/km2 in Gaza City are the
outcome, peaking at 8,700 persons/km2, which is com-
parable to London (see Figure 1).
The urbanization gets amplified by rural-urban mi-
gration, better job opportunities (e.g. Nikisic, Nasser Ed-
din, & Cali, 2014) and a lesser impairment of daily prac-
tices due to mobility restrictions (e.g. El-Atrash, 2016).
Scarcity of building land, limited means for mobilising
building land complemented by presumed trends to-
wards real estate bubbles (Palestine Economic Policy Re-
search Institute—MAS, 2012) lead to a so-called hous-
ing crisis (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics [PCBS],
2007, 2015a, 2015b), stressing the little number of af-
fordable houses available. Razeq (2015) reports an av-
erage amount of 1,450$ per month necessary to afford
good quality housing for a family in Gaza. The number
can be contrasted with a 40% poverty rate, the highest
unemployment rate in the world and 70% of the work-
Figure 1. Khan Yunis in the south of the Gaza Strip. Destroyed or ruined buildings are a common impression in the dense
urban pattern.
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ing cohort in Gaza being employed in the private sector,
earning an average monthly wage of 174$ per person
(World Bank, 2015). The discussed responses to hous-
ing crises in Gaza include active land management poli-
cies, high density solutions, the support of self-organised
repair and building activities, land-saving building pat-
terns and price caps for building land as well as re-
organised apartment floor plans (e.g. Asfour, 2012). In
the West Bank, limited building land resulted in infor-
mality (e.g. Alfasi, 2014; Chiodelli, 2012) and construc-
tion of buildings without permits, as a result of which
they are constantly threatened by demolition and re-
moval (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Af-
fairs oPt [OCHA oPt], 2015a). Different studies are ex-
ploring the opportunity of polycentric development (Af-
founeh, 2014) and possible locations for new suburban
centres (AbuSada & Thawaba, 2011) in the metropolitan
region Ramallah-Jerusalem. Complementary debates are
revolving around micro-scale planning action and the
value of insurgent planning (e.g. Porter et al., 2013),
community based approaches (e.g. Ibrahim & Domgjoni,
2015; Jabareen & Carmon, 2010) andmicro socio-spatial
practices challenging the spatial logics laid down by the
official institutional framework (Gazit & Latham, 2014).
The commonality of those debates is rooted in the gen-
eral conditions and the planning systems of the two parts
of the territory—Gaza strip and the West Bank.
1.1. Aim and Method
The aim of this article is to examine and illustrate how
spatial and institutional dimensions of power (Yiftachel,
1998) occurred in the planning process of an interna-
tional designworkshop. The study is based on a research-
through- design approach (Frayling, 1993; Godin, 1993;
Stappers, 2007), building on the main assumption that
the act of designing has the potential to create insights,
skills and knowledge of wicked problems (Rittel, 1972;
Rittel &Webber, 1973). Invited by UN-Habitat and UNDP,
two teams of international planners (ISOCARP) were in-
vited to visioning workshops. The aim of those work-
shopswas to reflectwith local stakeholders and actors on
current challenges and practices and formulate visions
for the time of full Palestinian sovereignty including open
borders and freemovement. The workshops were set up
as a mix of different methods, featuring interviews, fo-
cus groups, field trips and group discussions with local
stakeholders (e.g. municipalities, planning departments,
Women’s Affair Technical Committee), planning profes-
sionals, NGOs (e.g. IPCC, Save Youth Future Society),
academia (e.g. An-Najah University, Bard College) and
public administration (e.g.Ministry of Local Government,
PNSP, Ministry of Transportation). The developed visions
are not considered to be future conformance-oriented
goals but a means to instigate further discussions and
reflections on possible action. The results of the work-
shops are available in three reports (ISOCARP, 2015a,
2015b, 2016).
The structure of the paper is as follows: In section 2
we introduce the current planning issues in the Gaza
Strip and theWest Bank that were addressed in thework-
shop and contextualise them. In section 3 we zoom in
on the topic of mobility and transportation and illustrate
signs of power dimensions that occurred in the design
process. In section 4 we conclude that planning is not be-
nign and that power dimensions are extending to plan-
ning practises.
2. Planning in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
The situation in the West Bank and in Gaza can be de-
scribed as a protracted crisis with a declining humanitar-
ian situation (European Commission, 2016), due to the
prolonged Israeli occupation, the blockage of the Gaza
strip for a decade and the recurring infringement of in-
ternational law by e.g. settlement activities in the West
Bank. In the West Bank vulnerabilities are rooting in oc-
cupation policies and military orders (e.g. Coon, 1992;
El-Atrash, 2016; OCHA oPt, 2015a), settler violence (e.g.
Eiran & Krause, 2016; Hanauer, 1995) and extension of
settlements (e.g. Salamanca et al., 2012), increased num-
ber of demolition and increased restrictions on move-
ment. In 2016 a 60% increase of demolitions and confis-
cations of Palestinian property and homes, compared to
2015 has been reported (European Commission, 2016).
Between 1988 and 2016, 16,087 demolition orders have
been issued: thereof 3,344 have been executed, 209 files
closed, 9,138 are still in process, 2,909 are on hold due
to legal processes and 487 are ready for execution at any
given moment (OCHA oPt, 2015b, 2016). Thus, 300,000
people in area C (West Bank total population 2.86 mil-
lions) can be considered in constant risk of displacement.
2.1. West Bank
Thedivision of theWest Bank into the areas A, B andCori-
gins in the 1995 InterimAgreement between the PLOand
the Israeli Government. Area A delineates the major pre-
existing Palestinian urban agglomerations (ca. 18% WB)
and is under full Palestinian jurisdiction and civil control
(see Figure 2). Area B are the peri-urban areas surround-
ing the urban cores of area A or small towns (21% WB).
Area B is under Palestinian civil- and Israeli security con-
trol. The ‘remaining’ 61% of the West Bank are Area C,
which is controlled and governed by the Israeli Civil Ad-
ministration (ICA)—including all civic matters, such as
health or education. This division is also mirrored in the
planning system: in areas A and B Palestinian adminis-
tration is responsible for planning and development is-
sues, while in Area C planning is controlled by ICA, which
still strongly focuses on military interests and territorial
expansion (see Coon, 1992; UN Habitat, 2015). This di-
vision has resulted in an artificial land scarcity because
Area C is virtually not available and disposable for the
Palestinian communities. Thus, 61% of the West Bank
are inhabited by only 6% of the 2,649,000 population
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Figure 2. Area A delineates the major pre-existing Palestinian urban agglomerations, such as Ramallah, and is under full
Palestinian jurisdiction and civil control.
(additional 628,000 Israeli settlers) since outline plans,
the provision with technical infrastructure (e.g. roads,
water), issuing of building permits (including refurbish-
ment or upgrading) are executed and controlled by the
Israeli administration. Different authors and various UN
agencies are reporting on the arbitrary, ambiguous deci-
sions in issuing such permits. OCHA (OCHA oPt, 2015a,
2015b) reports that between 2010 and 2014 only 1.5%
of submitted applications were approved. More recently
Hague (Hague, 2016) reported that although local zon-
ing and outline plans match the international technical
standards, only three of them were approved and the
rest denied based on the alleged technical deficiency. As
a result, informal building activities are taking place, ad-
ditionally enhanced by the artificial land scarcity and ar-
bitrary practices (see also Hague, Crookston, Wegener,
Platt, & Gladki, 2016).
2.2. Gaza Strip
In the Gaza Strip (356 km2), between Gaza City in the
North and Khan Yunis (see Figure 1) in the South, a
metropolitan area trends along theMediterranean Coast
(41 km). Entering the 10th year of the ‘Gaza blockage’,
communities are struggling to cope with the complex-
ities of a hostile environment under siege, causing de-
teriorating socio-economic conditions, confinement of
citizens to the Gaza strip (restricted access, movement
and exit of citizens and other civics, controlled by Israeli
administration), limited trade of goods such as building
material required for reconstruction and housing. The
lastmajor conflict in 2014 caused approximately 100,000
internally displaced people, 16,000 destroyed housing
units (see Figure 3) which are beyond repair (Norwe-
gian Refugee Council, 2015) as well as severe damage
to the water and sanitation infrastructure (United Na-
tions Information System on the Question of Palestine
[UNISPAL], 2014). The planning and housing situation
in the Gaza Strip is severely affected by the past and
on-going conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Re-
ports confirm that whereas the supply of building ma-
terial became easier, the housing demands are still not
met (PCBS, 2015b). Thus, the density in themetropolitan
area along the coast is expected to increase further due
to population growth and the confinement to the area.
Hence, twomillion people (PCBS, 2015a) that are living in
the Gaza Strip are facing daily challenges concerning frag-
ile housing situation, reconstruction, job provision, envi-
ronmental degradation and the so-called ‘SUGI energy-
food-water-nexus’ (see also Asfour, 2012; Koek, Arafat, &
Clutterbuck, 2015). Still, most of the land remains unreg-
istered resulting in a clandestine land-market and infor-
mal transactions. Planning itself is embedded on munic-
ipal level, but comprehensive strategies such as legally
approved housing policies are still lacking (see also As-
four, 2017).
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Figure 3. Demolition of housing suburbs in the Gaza Strip.
2.3. Institutional Framework
Spatial and urban planning in Palestine stems back to
the early 19th century and is a unique assemblage of
planning approaches, laws and regulations from differ-
ent periods and administrations. A comprehensive anal-
ysis on the history and difficulties of the Palestinian plan-
ning systemand its implications on the Palestinian spatial
and territorial development are provided by e.g. Coon
(1992), Altrock (1998), Shalbak (2013) and El-Atrash
(2016). The legal framework governing planning, land
tenure and administration goes back to the Ottoman pe-
riod (1850–1917). During this time, first statuary road
and building regulations were implemented. Under the
British mandate (1917–1948), town planning was en-
forced in the British fashion but remained limited to ur-
ban areas, such as Jaffa, Haifa, Nablus or Gaza. A hi-
erarchical planning system (central and local level for
construction, building permits, roads, etc.) was imple-
mented and later complemented by regional and local
plans. After the end of the British mandate, when Jor-
dan annexed the West Bank and Gaza was placed un-
der Egyptian administration, the British planning system
and structural plans remained in force. In this time pe-
riod, land registration was introduced (see also Koek et
al., 2015). However, most of the land remained unregis-
tered since land owners tried to avoid registration costs
and land taxation (Koek et al., 2015) resulting in prob-
lems regarding land-tenure, land management and infor-
mal housing markets in Gaza, which is commented by an
interview partner: “The land ownership system that ex-
ists in Gaza is a rather complicated system and it affects
future planning” (N. A.). For the West Bank unregistered
land is under constant threat of Israeli confiscation, but
also attaining building permits is impossible without offi-
cial land-titles. Israeli occupation (1967) brought a great
number of military orders, carried out by the ICA, which
superimposed a military governance system over regu-
lar civil law (e.g. Coon, 1992; El-Atrash, 2016). However,
shortcomings and ill adaptions of the current planning
systems are reported:
The second element is related to the packages of laws
& byelaws related to urban issues like planning law,
building regulation & byelaws, stipulation of private
land and laws. This legal package inherited from long
ago is unsuitable to dealwith the actual problems that
our cities currently face.When these laws were elabo-
rated and adopted 50–60 years ago, the dimension of
socio-economic development was not taken into con-
sideration and it was related just to land use and trans-
portation network. (H. A.)
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3. Power Dimensions Occurring in the Workshops and
Discussions
One important matter that was addressed in both work-
shops was the issue of mobility, the future development
of urban centres and their connection. In the West Bank
workshop, the debates illustrated the impediments and
disruptions of daily practices due to the separation wall
(see Figure 4), security measures, checkpoints and road-
blocks. Additionally, the infrastructure networks are seg-
regated systems: Palestinians are restricted to certain
roads and have restricted access to roads in Area C (see
Figure 5). One example is theHighway 443 connecting Tel
Aviv with Jerusalem, cutting into the West Bank: Pales-
tinians without permits to work or travel inside Israel
are not allowed, several Palestinian communities need
to take excessive detours to reach Ramallah because of
the blocked highway.
The second main design narrative was to conceptu-
alise Ramallah, Jerusalem and Bethlehem as ametropoli-
tan region with complementary qualities and functions.
These two topics are strongly interlinked: private trans-
port is cluttering and congesting the cities, dominating
the public space and streets. The connections between
the cities are organised by a mix of buses, minibuses
and shared taxis that have to cross Area C and are thus
exposed to mobility restrictions. The importance of de-
veloping more sustainable mobility solutions on the re-
gional and urban scale was addressed by different work-
shop participants:
For sure, I mean the road system is the system that
is forming now the backbone and will still form the
backbone of the transport system to my better under-
standing. Of course, more should go towards the tran-
sit system, for example, the bus rapid transit system,
other kinds of mass transit because this will make ef-
ficient use. This should be accompanied with policies
to restrict the ownership of the vehicles, the automo-
biles, so on and so forth. This is one of the major de-
velopments that we should take into account to de-
velop the roads not specifically only the physical struc-
ture of the road but also the kind or the type or the
mode of the transportation. We should invest more
in the rapid transit or the mass transit or the public
transportation. Now beside this, I think theremust be
also the development of the rail but in a wise man-
ner. I mean rail is very expensive; topography is not
verymuch suitable. You have two kinds of rail—rail for
the close communities—urban centres where there is
very high demand, then you have the light rail, metro
or any other kind of urban rail system. (S. E.)
The proposals developed during the workshop focused
on two scales: (a) regional scale, connecting the cities
of the metropolitan region in a North-South direction,
Figure 4. Separation wall cutting through the Palestinian landscape.
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Figure 5. The segregated road-network exacerbates the daily life and practices of the Palestinian population (illustration
by authors, based on data from visualisingpalestine.com and ISOCARP, 2015a).
and subsequently considering the future train stations
as possible development nuclei on urban scale (b). On
the regional scale, a light rail system connecting the ma-
jor urban centres Ramallah, Jerusalem and Bethlehem
was proposed. At the train stations, the local mobility sys-
tems are interlinked. Thosemain routes were outlined as
possible areas to increase densities to accommodate the
housing demand and connect the different communities
and neighbourhoods, which are now rather isolated due
to the hilly landscape (see Figure 6).
Another strong debate revolved around the impor-
tance of an airport in the West Bank, which was strongly
advocated by local planning professionals, representa-
tives of administration and academics:
(...) other modes are needed like the sea, air for con-
necting Palestine with rest of the world, connecting
Gaza Strip with theWest Bank in addition to the corri-
dor that is being suggested. We also need to connect
people by air between West Bank and Gaza. (S. E.)
Also, something to connect the future state of Pales-
tine with international and regional dimension as to
enlarge and redevelop the area of Gaza Airport and
to have another regional airport in theWest Bank. The
latter to be as commercial airport (...) (H. A.)
Yasser Arafat airport, located close to Rafah at the Egyp-
tian border, was built based on the agreements set in the
Oslo Accords. It was bombed in 2001 during the al-Aqsa
Intifada, and the runway was destroyed in 2002 (see Fig-
ure 7). From a strictly technical perspective, the claim for
two airports would likely seem elusive, with Tel Aviv and
Amman in reach and the design context of free move-
ment and open borders. However, the strong opinions
on the importance of airports in the Gaza Strip andWest
Bank and connecting ‘the people by air between West
Bank andGaza’ are owed to the limited freedomofmove-
ment within the Palestine territories and the general dif-
ficulties and chicaneries for Palestinian at Tel Aviv Airport
to leave and return to the country, given they even reach
the airport due to frequent road closures. Thosemobility
impediments make the means of regulation and control
evident and can be interpreted as a reaction to the per-
ceived and de-facto non-sovereignty of a community and
individuals tomakemeaningful decisions about theirmo-
bility and spatial practices (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002;
Yiftachel, 1998).
Also at the Gaza workshop, mobility and mobility
impediment were among the core topics. In the Gaza
strip, the urban areas are stringed along the coastal zone
with two major centres Gaza (North) and Khan Yunis
and Rafah in the South. The current mobility patterns
are characterised by individual car traffic and a not well-
functioning minibus system that is connecting different
localities along the coast. The Gaza blockage and limited
amount of resources also instigated a strong discussion
on future options of mobility and mobility practices. In
the case of Gaza, a link to Jerusalem and further to Cairo
via an expressway and railway along the eastern border
was developed. The location was chosen because it was
either still undeveloped or was cleared by the Israeli as
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Figure 6.Vision for themetropolitan region Ramallah, JerusalemandBethlehem integrating sustainablemobility and urban
development (Goethals, 2016).
a consequence of the disengagement in 2005. The his-
toric train path, connecting Gaza with Cairo, still exists,
but it is rather underdeveloped and therefore unsuitable
for hosting the train track of the strong integration in the
built-up area. The stations in Khan Yunis and Gaza are
considered as mobility hubs interlinking with the public
transport system and to the two seaports. The port in
Gaza is seen as logistic centre towards Israel and the one
in South as a fishing port. The mobility system is com-
plemented by a biking network located on the former
train path. Advocating a resource saving mobility alter-
native and providing space was considered adequate for
the Gaza Strip due to its flat landform (other than in the
West Bank).
For the West Bank, particularly strong debates occur
on the topic of locating a train line around Jerusalem,
especially considering the spatial-political discussions on
the Israeli E1 (East1) zone. E1 is a synonym for an Israeli
development plan including 15,000 residential homes
(12 km2) located within the Palestinian territories in the
East of Jerusalem. The plan is contested because there
is the threat of increasingly bisecting the West Bank and
exacerbating the linkages between East Jerusalem from
the rest of the West Bank (see also Hakala, 2012). Even
though a very schematic and general vision was devel-
oped, several variations and adaptions were necessary
to achieve a somewhat politically agreeable version:
Gaza, for example, I look at the proposed railway
direction—it is a logical location, but it feels wrong—
because it’s near to the border with Israel. But I also
know, in the end, it’s 6 km—it’s going to be either
in the east or in the middle, as it was in the past.
Or Jerusalem, I do not totally agree with the pro-
posed path of the railway, I prefer a ring road for now,
but I think it can be implemented in about ten years.
Maybe I do not believe in all the proposed concepts,
it’s mainly a different perspective. (T. B.)
The discussions demonstrate that spatial debates trig-
ger political debates and reveal power structures. Dis-
cussing the track of a railway line or an expressway is less
a technical debate. It is rather a debate on the meaning
of this line for political negotiation processes and an ex-
pression of powerlessness of the Palestinian community
to improve their livelihoods via planning. Limited hous-
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Figure 7. Destroyed Yasser Arafat International Airport at the southern border in the Gaza Strip.
ing opportunities, restrictedmobility options, separation
walls, containment into a certain area, road blocks, in-
formal housing, demolition of houses and the destruc-
tion of spatial structures all indicate the spatial dimen-
sion of power and control in the West Bank and in the
Gaza Strip (Yiftachel, 1998). As for the institutional di-
mension of power, we can see that with the lack of land-
titles, the institutional framework for Area C is inhibit-
ing Palestinian authorities from implementing plans and
policies and creating a statutory relationship between
the authorities and citizens (Forester, 1993). The lack of
planning authority in Area C restricts all spatial initiatives
and development plans and also exacerbates the mobil-
ity developments that are actually envisaged. Further, it
prevents spatial practices of individuals, by rejecting in-
dividual applications for building permits. An interview
partner commented on this power dimension:
You know what is really bothering me—when you are
at a conference and you sit down with the planners—
they consider our case most as ‘post-conflict’. I ask
then, what does that mean post-conflict? We are not
in ‘post-conflict’—we are under occupation. It’s a dif-
ference of thinking in planning—if you want to plan
it’s not the same. (T. D.)
In the self-governed Areas A and B but also in Gaza, re-
ported institutional ill-adaptations are witnesses of cur-
rent and historic institutional power struggles, rooting
in the various design implements by foreign administra-
tions and occupants.
4. Concluding Remarks
As for the relation between power, politics and planning,
the West Bank and Gaza are showing similarities. How-
ever, we argue that reflecting on such different extreme
cases can shed some light on how planning practices and
experiences are related with power struggles. The cur-
rent planning practices are deeply rooted in the long-
standing separation of the Gaza Strip and theWest Bank.
Policies, plans and the planning debate are pervaded by
political meaning and subtext, expressing the struggles
for recognition and sovereignty to develop plans and im-
plement them. We learned that the power dimensions
(Yiftachel, 1998) are extending into the design process
itself, so that even plain actions like drawing a line on
a conceptual sketch turn into a signifier of power rela-
tions and political meaning. We indeed experienced the
effects of the “dark side of planning”, how planning exer-
cises power in an institutional and spatial environment
and create realities on the ground that are impacting and
in this case significantly restricting everyday life and so-
cial and cultural practices. The example shows that ur-
ban, regional and mobility planning practises can be pro-
gressive, pluralistic or oppressive and it appears there is
a certain naivety and blindness towards the latter, mis-
takenly believing that planning is per se a positive agent
of change. We argue that a critical attitude on actual
institutional practises and the structural role that plan-
ners play in planning regimes is crucial for working in
such contexts. “Should planner speak up?” was the un-
comfortable question Cliff Hague (Hague, 2016) asked
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Figure 8. Separation Wall in the West Bank.
the academic community and different planning associa-
tions, reflecting on repressive institutional planning prac-
tises in theWest Bank. ‘The philosophers have only inter-
preted the world in various ways. The point is, however,
that planning changes it’—Marx would perhaps answer.
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